The Relationship of Freedom to the Acquisition, Possession, and Exercise of Virtue :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

ABSTRACT: There are three common objections that any broadly Aristotelian virtue theorist must face, insofar as he or she holds that acts must be performed from a firm and stable disposition in order to express virtue, and that virtue is in some way a praiseworthy fulfillment of human potential. Each of these objections accuses the virtuous person of not fully exercising his or her rationality and freedom, and thus of being somehow less than fully human. There are three common objections that any broadly Aristotelian virtue theorist must face, insofar as he or she holds that acts must be performed from a firm and stable disposition in order to be called acts expressing virtue, and that virtue is in some way a praiseworthy fulfillment of human potential. Each of these objections accuse the virtuous person of not fully exercising his or her rationality and freedom, and thus of being somehow less than fully human. The first objection is that acts flowing from the firm and stable disposition of virtue need not be expressions of rationality and freedom, since they may be performed by rote. The second objection, related to the first, has to do with the voluntariness of the possession of virtue. Those who hold that the virtues must be firm and stable dispositions generally hold that a good upbringing from childhood is of utmost importance in the acquisition of such dispositions. The second objection is thus as follows: if a person’s virtue depends upon her upbringing, then she is not responsible for her virtue; it was not up to her and she deserves no praise. The first objection, then, is that particular acts from a firm disposition of virtue are not fully rational or free; the second objection is that the acquisition of the dispositions themselves is not fully rational or free, since it depends upon upbringing. If neither the possession nor the exercise of virtue need be rational and free, then it seems that the activity of virtue is less than fully human, and thus cannot be the praiseworthy fulfillment of our human potential. The third objection, like the second, also has to do with the importance of one’s upbringing to the virtuous life, but is a bit more pointed. Those who present the third objection argue that the acquisition of virtue, inasmuch as it requires such a directive upbringing, itself constitutes a limitation of one’s freedom.